NAESS Shipping Philippines, Inc., vs. NLRC

 NAESS Shipping Philippines, Inc., vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 73441 September 4, 1987

Facts:

September 3, 1983, while the vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas enroute from Santos, Brazil to Port Said, Egypt, Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward, fatally stabbed the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez, during a quarrel, then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. An alarm was immediately raised, and the vessel turned to comb the surrounding area for Dublin. After some time his floating body was briefly sighted, but it disappeared from view even as preparations to retrieve it were being made, and was never seen again although the search went on through.

Under a Special Agreement in the employment contract, between the International Workers Federation (ITF) and NAESS Shipping, NAESS is bound to pay cash benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled therein.

For the death of Dublin his widow Zenaida, by whom he had one child, Ivy, collected the amount of P75,000.00 under Clause A of the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement.  She also filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against NAESS  for payment of death benefits to US$74,512.00 under both paragraph 17 of the cited Special Agreement and what she claimed to be the also applicable Singapore Workmens' Compensation Ordinance.

The POEA rendered judgment for the complainant, holding Dublin's death compensable under said Special Agreement and ordering NAESS to pay complainant and her child compensation benefits totalling US$31,962.00 and her attorneys of record fees amounting to US$3,196.00, the equivalents of said sums in Philippine pesos at prevailing rates of exchange.

NAESS filed a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed by the NLRC for lack of merit, with an express affirmance of the POEA decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the POEA and the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adjudging that death by suicide is compensable.

Ruling:

No. It makes no difference whether Dublin intentionally took his own life, or he killed himself in a moment of temporary aberration triggered by remorse over the killing of the second cook, or he accidentally fell overboard while trying to flee from imagined pursuit, which last possibility cannot be ruled out considering the state of the evidence.

There is no question that NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin's death while in its service, regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer, in the legal sense, of Dublin's life.

To compel payment of death benefits in this case would amount not only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide, but also inequitably to placing on NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the killer and his victim, who allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death benefits clause.

This argument, in confusing the legal implications and effects of two distinct and independent agreements, carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. On Dublin's part, entitlement to death benefits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of employment; it was not a consequence of his killing of the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez. If the latter's death is also compensable, that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a similar contract, not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin That both deaths may be related by cause and effect and NAESS is the single obligor liable for compensation in both cases must, insofar as the factual and legal bases of such liability is concerned, be regarded as purely accidental circumstances.

Main point:

 

No law or rule has been cited which would make it illegal for an employer to assume such obligation in favor of his or its employee in their contract of employment. 

Thus, contract which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their form may be, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.

DIGESTED BY: Sharifa Almeera Tuahan